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Abstract: Since Mates’ seminal Stoic Logic there has been uncertainty and debate 
about how to treat the term anapodeiktos when used of Stoic syllogisms. This paper 
argues that the customary translation of anapodeiktos by ‘indemonstrable’ is accurate, 
and it explains why this is so. At the heart of the explanation is an argument that, 
contrary to what is commonly assumed, indemonstrability is rooted in the generic 
account of the Stoic epistemic notion of demonstration (apodeixis). Some minor 
insights into Stoic logic ensue.    
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Chrysippus’ five kinds of basic syllogisms. Arguably the most well-known elements of 
Stoic logic are Chrysippus’ five kinds of anapodeiktoi, or indemonstrables, as the Greek 
expression is commonly rendered.
1
 Stoic standard examples, one of each kind, are 
 
1. If it is day, it is light. But it is day. Hence it is light. 
2. If it is day, it is light. But it is not light. Hence it is not day. 
3. Not: both it is day and it is night. But it is day. Hence not: it is night. 
4. Either it is day or it is night. But it is day. Hence it is not night. 
5. Either it is day or it is night. But it is not night. Hence it is day. 
                                                          
1
 Some alternative translations are: ‘non-demonstrables’ (Bury 1933, 1935), ‘undemonstrated’ (Mates 
1961, p.63 ‘unproveds’ (Barnes 1980, 1985 p.431 in the 2012 reprint (‘indemonstrables’ in the 
original, 1985, p.576), 2003, p.14; 2007, e.g. p.371, p.507), ‘unprovables’ (Annas & Barnes 2000), 
‘undemonstrateds’ (Hitchcock 2006). 
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These indemonstrables are Stoic syllogisms; that is, arguments valid due to their form.
2
  
 
The incongruence problem and a solution. As has been repeatedly remarked, the Greek 
verbal adjective anapodeiktos, as is the case in general with adjectives formed with an alpha 
privative and ending in ‘-tos’, has two possible main translations: one factive, e.g. 
‘undemonstrated’ or ‘unproved’ and one expressing (absence of) potentiality or possibility: 
e.g. ‘indemonstrable’ or ‘unprovable’ (cf. e.g. Frede 1974, 127-9, Barnes 2007, 369). 
Philosophically, the difference between those two options is significant. Something that has 
not been proved may be provable. For example, if an axiom in a system has not been proved 
but is provable, it is redundant. If it is unprovable, it is not. It is reasonable to assume that the 
Stoics had at least unreflective knowledge of this systematic lexical ambiguity in 
anapodeiktos, and that they intended the word to be taken in one of these two core meanings 
(so also Barnes 2007, 369). Consistent with this assumption, some ancient works on logic 
distinguish more than one usage of anapodeiktos (SE M 8.223, Apul. Int. 205.21-206.5, both 
quoted below). One may think that the main question is which of the two meanings the Stoics 
intended; and derivatively and accordingly, what the right translation of anapodeiktos is in 
the context of Stoic logic. Things are more complicated, however.  
 
Jonathan Barnes, in his 2007 tour de force through ancient logic, Truth, etc., notes that 
several ancient texts distinguish two meanings of anapodeiktos, but that surprisingly, the one 
attributed to the Stoics appears not to be a meaning anapodeiktos actually has (Barnes 2007, 
370). Rather, the texts suggest that the Stoics used anapodeiktos for arguments that need no 
proof; a meaning the word does not carry (Barnes 2007, 370-71). So we have an expression 
with two grammatically attested meanings neither of which seems to be the Stoic one; and we 
have an attribution to the Stoics of a meaning that is not grammatically attested. How can we 
make sense of this incongruence?   
 
We can assume that the Stoics themselves believed and stated that their anapodeiktoi were 
not in need of proof. This is well-documented in ancient texts and is not in doubt (SE M 
8.223, SE PH 2.156, DL 7.79).
3
  
                                                          
2
 For details see DL 7.80-81, SE PH 2.157-9, SE M 8.224-7, Gal. Inst.Log.VI.6, [Galen] Hist.Phil.15 
and Frede 1974, 137-52; Bobzien 1996, 134-41; 2019, 243-46.  
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(A) And there are some [arguments] that are indemonstrable(s) (anapodeiktoi) since 
they do not need a demonstration (apodeixeōs).4 (DL 7.79)   
 
(B) For they say [the anapodeiktoi] are the arguments which are not in need of 
demonstration (apodeixeōs) for the establishment of their own conclusiveness.5 (SE 
PH 2.156)  
 
It is also plausible that, when calling the anapodeiktoi anapodeiktoi, the Stoics did not intend 
the term to mean that they need no proof. Accepting these assumptions, Barnes tentatively 
offers the following suggestion. With the choice of meanings of anapodeiktos for the Stoics 
being between ‘unproved’ or ‘indemonstrable/unprovable’, it has to be ‘unproved’: with this 
intended meaning, the Stoic claim that the anapodeiktoi are not in need of proof provides a 
reason for their so naming them (Barnes 2007, 370-371).
6
   
 
Hitchcock 2006, p.239, fn.29, echoes Barnes’ argument.  Additionally, he spells out 
explicitly the common assumption that the Stoic terms apodeixis (proof, demonstration) and 
anapodeiktos signify a Stoic deduction, or result of a Stoic analysis, and its absence, 
respectively, and thus (it is implied) differ in meaning from the Stoic epistemic notion of 
apodeixis for which we find definitions elsewhere in our sources. Call this the Two-senses 
Assumption. The first proponent both of a translation ‘undemonstrated/unproved’ and of the 
Two-senses Assumption appears to be Benson Mates (Mates 1961, 63, see below). I have 
reservations both about the ‘undemonstrated/unproved’ translation and about the Two-senses 
Assumption. In what follows I offer an alternative resolution of the above-stated 
incongruence. It is grounded in a rejection of the Two-senses Assumption.  
 
My starting point is textual. Barnes’ and Hitchcock’s explanations face a difficulty in 
connection with the evidence for the Stoic use reported by Sextus, who writes 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
3
 Besides these two texts, also SE M 8.223, quoted below as (C); all in Barnes 2007. There seems to 
be indirect support in Gal. Int.Log. 8.1 and Apul. Int.205.21-206.5, quoted below as (G). 
4
 εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἀναπόδεικτοί τινες, τῷ μὴ χρῄζειν ἀποδείξεως. (DL 7.79)   
5
  οὗτοι γάρ εἰσιν οὕς φασιν ἀποδείξεως μὲν μὴ δεῖσθαι πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν σύστασιν. (SE PH 2.156)  
6
 Barnes concludes that ‘the standard translation’ (of anapodeiktos by ‘indemonstrable’) ‘is 
demonstrably inaccurate’  (Barnes 2007, 371).  
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(C) ‘Anapodeiktoi’ is used of syllogisms7 in two senses, as arguments that have not 
been demonstrated and as arguments that have no need of demonstration because for 
them it is immediately evident that they conclude (i.e. are syntactically valid).
8
 And 
we have frequently indicated that [Chrysippus’ anapodeiktoi] as they are set out at the 
beginning of the first book of his Introduction to Syllogisms are so called by the 
second sense.
9
  (SE M 8.223) 
 
Sextus does not just state generically that anapodeiktos has two senses. He is more specific: It 
is arguments or syllogisms of which anapodeiktos ‘is used ... in two senses’, as is implied by 
the nominative masculine plural. This suggests that we get a historically based report on an 
element of ancient logic. It is likely that the report is of two philosophical uses, each calling 
some valid arguments anapodeiktoi but in a different sense, where the second includes the 
Stoic position held by Chrysippus. In the first use, anapodeiktoi are so named, since the 
arguments have not been demonstrated. This is straightforward ancient Greek. I am not 
concerned here with whose view this may have been.
10
 Sextus’ description of the second 
view is more complex in that it includes a reason why anapodeiktoi are said not to need 
demonstration (‘because ...’).    
 
Barnes’ suggested rendering ‘unproved’ makes this part of (C) more perplexing than a 
translation as ‘indemonstrable’ or ‘unprovable’ would. Sextus’ distinction appears to be 
                                                          
7
 The nominative plural masculine requires some masculine noun. The context provides logos 
(‘argument’) in SE M 8.224-5. Alternatively, the book title by Chrysippus mentioned at the end of SE 
M 8.223, Introduction to Syllogisms, makes sullogismos (‘syllogism’) another option, which is 
preferred by Barnes 2007, 372. Either way the arguments at issue are valid arguments, and we know 
that the Stoic anapodeiktoi were syllogisms. 
8
 Conclude the conclusion from the premises, that is. Cf. SE M 8.228. 
9
  ἀναπόδεικτοι λέγονται διχῶς, οἵ τε μὴ ἀποδεδειγμένοι καὶ οἱ μὴ χρείαν ἔχοντες ἀποδείξεως τῷ 
αὐτόθεν εἶναι περιφανὲς ἐπ᾿αὐτῶν τὸ ὅτι συνάγουσιν. ἐπεδείξαμεν δὲ πολλάκις ὡς κατὰ τὸ δεύτερον 
σημαινόμενον ταύτης ἠξίωνται τῆς προσηγορίας οἱ κατ᾿ἀρχὴν τῆς πρώτης περὶ συλλογισμῶν 
εἰσαγωγῆς παρὰ τῷ Χρυσίππῳ τεταγμένοι. (SE M 8.223) 
10
 Aristotle uses anapodeiktos in his syllogistic at An.Pr. 53
a
32 and 
b
2, where it appears to have the 
sense ‘undemonstrated’ (so also Barnes 1994, 95). Elsewhere Aristotle uses it with the sense 
‘indemonstrable’. In the Eudemian Ethics, he takes explicit note of the two senses of expressions with 
an alpha privative ending in ‘-tos’ (Arist. EE III 1, 1230b1-3). Later Peripatetics and Peripatetic-
inspired authors link the perfection of a syllogism with its indemonstrability (cf. Barnes et al 1991, 48 
fn.45) and with no need for a demonstration (so Galen and Alexander of Aphrodisias, see Barnes 
2007, 371-2). 
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between two different intended meanings for valid arguments or syllogisms. Barnes’ reading 
makes both uses of anapodeiktos have the same intended meaning, namely ‘unproved’ or 
‘undemonstrated’. They are distinct insofar as in the second use, but not the first, the 
arguments are said to be unproved for the reason that they are not in need of proof. This sits 
uncomfortably with Sextus’ ‘legontai dichōs’, which is commonly found for expressions that 
are employed with two different meanings – not for expressions used with the same intended 
meaning but used in that meaning for different reasons. (The point applies mutatis mutandis 
to Hitchcock 2006.)  
 
So this textual point suggests that it may be worth looking for an alternative explanation of 
the apparent incongruence of the Stoic use or understanding of anapodeiktos with which I 
started the paper. My aim is to show that there are philosophical reasons that endow the 
rendering ‘indemonstrable’ of the Stoic anapodeiktos with perfect sense. Here it helps to 
recall that the Greek anapodeiktos is cognate with apodeixis. In Stoic logic, apodeixis 
(‘demonstration’) is an epistemic term, i.e. a term that concerns cognition, and not a purely 
logical term. The generally very reliable summary of Stoic logic in Diogenes has   
 
(D) A demonstration is an argument (logos) that [validly] concludes (perainonta) 
from what is more easily grasped (katalambanomenōn) that which is less easily 
grasped.
11
 (DL 7.45)  
 
The verb ‘to grasp’ (katalambanein) is the Stoic term for factive cognition that falls short of 
knowledge, the latter being reserved for the sages. Sextus reports an almost certainly Stoic 
definition of apodeixis (this is supported by terminology and context) that is both less generic 
and adds more detail:
12
  
 
                                                          
11
 τὴν δ᾿ἀπόδειξιν λόγον διὰ τῶν μᾶλλον καταλαμβανομένων τὸ ἧττον καταλαμβανόμενον 
περαίνοντα (DL 7.45). The definition of argumenti conclusio in Cicero Luc.26 is similar to (D) and 
likely to be Stoic. 
12
 Cf. Barnes 1980, Allen 2008, part III.5, and Hankinson 2009, 209, 212, for discussion of apodeixis 
in Hellenistic philosophy. 
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(E) A demonstration is, they say, an argument (logos) which reveals by concluding 
(kata sunagōgēn) a non-evident (adēlon) conclusion on the basis of agreed premises.13 
(SE PH 2.135, cf. SE PH 2.143) 
 
Definition (E) is a variant of (D). It is less generic, since the definition in (D) allows for 
degrees of ease of grasping, whereas in (E) the underlying distinction is simply between what 
is evident and what is non-evident and can be revealed. Both definitions agree that 
demonstrations (apodeixeis) are valid arguments: they conclude (perainein) or afford a 
concluding (sunagōgē).14 Text (E) is followed by a step-by-step explanation of the definition 
that culminates in the semi-schematically presented example of a demonstration, or 
demonstrative argument (apodeiktikos logos). 
 
(F) If sweat flows through the surface, there are imperceptible pores. But the first. 
Therefore the second.
15
 (SE PH 2.142, tr. Annas & Barnes) 
 
Both definitions characterize demonstration (apodeixis) in epistemic terms: ease of grasping 
and the non-evidence or unclarity of the conclusion together with its being revealed 
(ekkaluptomenon, SE PH 2.143, cf. 142); this is contrasted with the conclusion being evident 
or clear (prodēlon, ibid. 140). Now, Stoic terminology is rarely random, and uses of groups of 
cognates for the explanation or reference to the same philosophical notion abound. It is most 
plausible then that the Stoic term anapodeiktos was by the Stoics related to, and more 
specifically based on, the Stoic notion of apodeixis. (Mates 1961, 63, rejects this, but without 
convincing reasons, see below.)  
 
This relation would naturally be as follows. We are told in (C) (i) that the Stoic anapodeiktoi 
are syllogisms (and thus valid arguments) which need no apodeixis (see above with fn.9) and 
(ii) that this is so because “it is immediately evident that they are conclusive”.  Substitution in 
(C) of the definiens for the definiendum of the more generic definition of apodeixis (D) 
                                                          
13
 Ἔστιν οὖν, ὡς φασίν, ἡ ἀπόδειξις λόγος δι᾿ὁμολογουμένων λημμάτων κατὰ συναγωγὴν ἐπιφορὰν 
ἐκκαλύπτων ἄδηλον. (SE PH 2.135) In Stoic logic, sunagein, translated ‘to conclude’, and sunagōgē, 
translated ‘concluding’, are semantic; epiphora, translated ‘conclusion’, is syntactic.  
14
 Perainein and sunagein appear to be used synonymously in Stoic logic, and express that something 
is (validly) concluded. Validity is expressly mentioned in SE PH 2.137. 
15
 εἰ ῥέουσι διὰ τῆς ἐπιφανείας ἱδρῶτες, εἰσὶ νοητοὶ πόροι· ἀλλὰ μὴν τὸ πρῶτον· τὸ δεύτερον ἄρα (SE 
PH 2.142). 
7 
 
yields: (i) an anapodeiktos needs nothing that makes it more easily grasped/graspable than it 
already is, and (ii) this is so because it is immediately evident that it is conclusive. Now 
‘being evident’ is a Stoic epistemic term, and if something is ‘immediately evident’ this 
would imply that it is as easily grasped as things can be. From this it would follow that there 
is nothing more easily grasped that can be used on it to make it more easily graspable.
16
 This 
substantiates the suggestion that the demonstrations (apodeixeis) in (C) of which the 
indemonstrables (anapodeiktoi) have no need are those defined in (D): The most plausible 
and decisive explanatory answer to the question why something needs nothing that makes it 
more easily grasped or graspable than it already is would be: because it is already easily 
graspable to an extent that nothing can make it more easily graspable.
17
 By definition (D), in 
terms of Stoic apodeixis this yields: because it cannot be demonstrated; and that is, because it 
is indemonstrable. So the anapodeiktoi are not in need of a demonstration since they are 
indemonstrable. I propose that this is the link in Stoic logic between the Greek term 
anapodeiktos with the intended meaning ‘indemonstrable’ and the phrase ‘no need of a 
demonstration’, which provides an explication of a particular use of the term in that 
meaning. For, note that here we have a case of indemonstrability that is unusual in the 
following sense: it is combined not with the impossibility to realize the usual end of 
demonstration (say, cognitive access to the demonstrandum), but instead with the fact that the 
usual end of demonstration is already realized without demonstration.
18
  
                                                          
16
 I take it that for the Stoics ‘being immediately evident’ (εἶναι περιφανὲς) does not admit of degrees. 
I also assume that those for whom things are immediately graspable are people with the relevant 
rational skills and information. For example, someone without mastery of the notions of argument, 
premises, conclusion and formal validity may not find the indemonstrables immediately graspable. 
(Moreover, indemonstrables can be of great complexity; the immediate evidence concerns their form, 
and an indemonstrable will only be immediately evident once its form has been recognized.) I bypass 
any further questions regarding the descriptive or normative nature of this evidence, since this is not 
relevant to my main points.  
17
 Just as ‘it is light’ is only evident to a person who understands the sentence ‘it is light’ and grasps 
the Stoic proposition ‘it is light’, so the indemonstrables are evident only to those who have 
completed their development into fully rational beings. (See also previous note.) By emphasising that 
the syllogismhood of the indemonstrables needs no demonstration, where ‘demonstration’ is 
understood as the Stoic epistemic term, I take no stance on the question whether the Stoics were 
logical psychologists or logical anti-psychologists. Rather, the evidence of the indemonstrables is 
entirely compatible with the assumption that for the Stoics what makes the validity of their 
indemonstrables evident is a logical as opposed to psychological feature.  
18
 For the Stoics, there are truths that are non-evident, so satisfying one necessary condition for being 
demonstrable –demonstrations are by definition of the non-evident– while failing to satisfy the other, 
say that there is a valid argument from evident premises for them. ‘The number of stars is odd’ or 
‘The number of stars is even’ (whichever is true) is an example. Then there are truths that may satisfy 
the second necessary condition, but do not satisfy the first, because they are evident. Cf. Sextus’ 
discussions of demonstration, SE PH 2.135-143, M 8.299-314.  
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Further support for the solution. Of interest is in this context a passage in Apuleius’ De 
Interpretatione (Peri Hermeneias) which offers a threefold distinction for the Latin term 
indemonstrabilis (translating, no doubt, anapodeiktos, see Kneale & Kneale 1962, 164 and 
below) and states which of these is used for the first four Peripatetic syllogistic moods – the 
correlates in Aristotle’s syllogistic to the Stoic five kinds of indemonstrables. 
 
(G) Now … the first four are called indemonstrabilis – not because they cannot be 
demonstrated, like the measurement of the whole of the ocean, nor because they are 
not yet demonstrated, like the squaring of the circle, but because they are so simple 
and so evident that they do not need a demonstration.  (Apul. Int.205.21-206.5, tr. 
Barnes modified)
19
 
 
As Barnes 2007, 272-3 points out, the passage does not say that this threefold distinction is 
one of linguistic meanings and we have no reason to assume that it is meant to.  
 
In line with the explanation of the incongruence regarding anapodeiktos I just offered, 
passage (G) lends itself to the following interpretation. First, the ancients did not, for what we 
know, have a grammar book that explained to them the two meanings of alpha-privative-
prefixed verbal adjectives ending in ‘-tos’ (which  is paralleled by the Latin ‘-ibilis’ and ‘-
abilis’) that I mentioned earlier. Rather, we can assume that they had as part of their ordinary 
linguistic aptitude (and possibly without reflection) the knowledge that any meaning of 
anapodeiktos / indemonstrabilis would have to fit one of the two options: indemonstrable or 
undemonstrated (or in alternative translation, unprovable or unproved). Thus retrospectively 
we may be able to discern in any of Apuleius’ explications which of the two meanings it 
involves. Apuleius’ distinction is threefold, since from his, or rather his source’s, perspective, 
there were three distinct pertinent applications of indemonstrabilis, each related to a distinct 
kind of situation. He offers an example of each: (i) Situations in which it is humanly 
impossible to obtain a demonstration of something, with the result that the envisioned 
                                                          
19
 … igitur … primi quattuor indemonstrabiles nominentur, non quod demonstrari nequeant, ut 
universi maris aestimatio, aut quod non demonstrentur, sicut circuli quadratura, sed quod tam 
simplices tamque manifesti sint ut demonstratione non egeant (Apul.Int.205.21-206.5). The text is 
slightly corrupt. I adopt Barnes’ reading, and with Barnes 2007, Ramsey 2017 among others, I assume 
that Apuleius provides a three-fold distinction. With Ramsey 2017, 26-7 and the majority of 
manuscripts, I read nondum (not yet). Apuleius’ first two examples seem a tad out of date.  
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outcome of the demonstration is not obtained: the measure of the entire ocean; (ii) situations 
in which, although it may be humanly possible, a demonstration of something has not (yet) 
been obtained: the squaring of the circle; (iii) situations in which something one usually 
expects a demonstration to provide, i.e. simplicity and evidence, is already present before any 
demonstration has been attempted, and for that reason cannot be (and is not) provided by 
demonstration: (the syllogismhood or validity of) certain basic syllogisms.  
 
Here is an analogy to illustrate the main point of the distinction between (i) and (iii). The goal 
is to fill a glass with water. The expected outcome is to have a glass full of water. Take case 
(ii) first. It would compare with the situation in which a functional glass is empty, and hence 
has not (yet) been filled and is unfilled. Case (iii) would compare to a situation with a full 
glass of water. You cannot fill a full glass of water with water. A full glass is unfillable, 
because it is already full. At the same time, there is no need for it to be filled, since the 
intended outcome of filling a glass with water, a glass full of water, is already achieved. Case 
(i) might compare to a situation with a glass that has a sieve as bottom. Again you cannot fill 
the glass with water. It is unfillable. Still, the last two situations are fundamentally different: 
once the intended outcome cannot be achieved, once the intended outcome is already 
realized.  
 
Although in either of (i) and (iii) the situation is such that the syllogism is indemonstrable, 
and linguistically both (i) and (iii) would permit the translation ‘indemonstrable’, 
metaphysically the difference between them is as significant as that between (i) and (ii), and 
(ii) and (iii), respectively. A natural way to express succinctly what is significant about (iii), 
in contrast to (i) and (ii), is to say that no demonstration is needed. The meaning of the term 
is not thereby given. What distinguishes (i) from (iii) is not a matter of meaning of the 
expression anapodeiktos. It is a way of explaining two fundamentally different situations in 
which the same expression is used with the same meaning. Whether this meaning is being 
indemonstrable or being undemonstrated is not completely conclusive in (G). What is 
conclusive is that ultimately the syllogisms at issue need no demonstration because they are 
indemonstrable:  If for some reason the intended meaning was undemonstrated, then the 
reason for the syllogism’s being undemonstrated would be its indemonstrability. 
 
Interim result. Both Sextus in passage (C) and Apuleius in passage (G) report the 
application of the term anapodeiktos (indemonstrabilis) in the context of syllogistic. (So do 
10 
 
(A) and (B)) This makes it likely that they both report the same later ancient tradition of 
explaining anapodeiktos as used of syllogisms. If we additionally combine the results from 
passages (C) and (D) with those from (G), the balance tips toward the meaning 
‘indemonstrable’, and I will assume that this was the intended meaning.20 Either way, looking 
back, Apuleius’ demarcation of (iii) from (i) and (ii) can be used to better understand Sextus’ 
and Diogenes’ reports that the Stoic anapodeiktoi were syllogisms that are not in need of 
demonstration.  
 
Residual question. It may still seem puzzling why in some sources the Stoics in their 
syllogistic explained the term ‘indemonstrables’ by ‘need no demonstration’ ((B) and (A)) 
rather than ‘need no demonstration because they are self-evident’ or ‘need no demonstration 
because they are self-evident and as such permit no demonstration’. Texts (C) and (G) 
suggest that the accounts are abbreviated. And it can be readily explained why the 
abbreviation would retain the characterization ‘need no demonstration’. In Stoic logic, what 
needs to be shown of certain syllogisms is that they are endpoints in an analysis, or 
backwards-worked deduction; and that is, that they themselves are not in need of justification 
by means of other syllogisms. Without such endpoints, syllogistic would be susceptible to 
infinite regress arguments, a kind of argumentation the Stoics were aware of (e.g. 
Chrysippus’ Logical Investigations, PHerc 307, frg II). Assuming that in a syllogistic the 
guarantee of such an endpoint is the essential and primary concern, and the epistemic 
justification by immediate evidence is secondary, and the indemonstrability comes third, one 
can see how within Stoic syllogistic the account of the name anapodeiktoi was abbreviated to 
‘need no demonstration’, and also how at a later time this explication may possibly have 
morphed into a definition. The incongruence between the expression anapodeiktos and the 
apparent Stoic definition of anapodeiktoi as being not in need of demonstration thus finds an 
                                                          
20
 Thus I do not share Barnes’ conclusion that ‘In any event, one thing is plain: Apuleius does not 
think that first figure predicative syllogisms are called ‘indemonstrabilis’ in the sense of 
‘unprovable’.’ (Barnes 2007, 373). My view differs from Barnes’s in two respects. First, I argue that 
at least for the Stoics and in later ancient texts, when used of basic syllogisms, anapodeiktos is used 
with the intended meaning that expresses the absence of a potentiality or possibility.  Second, and 
more fundamentally, I argue that the Stoic term anapodeiktos, used of syllogisms, is by the Stoics 
understood as having its meaning derivative from the Stoic epistemic term apodeixis, rather than a 
special logical meaning (for which see below).  
11 
 
easy explanation.
21
 Note also that in other texts, e.g. SE M 8.228, text (H) below, the 
abbreviation appears to have gone the other way.  
   
Apodeixis and syllogisms. This connection between the Stoic epistemological term apodeixis 
and their core logical term anapodeiktos can be exploited further. As noted above, for the 
Stoics, if something is ‘immediately evident’ this implies that it is as easily grasped as things 
can be, and so that there is nothing more easily grasped that can be applied to it. Now the 
things at issue are syllogisms (or formally valid arguments) and their syllogismhood (or 
formal validity). So we can say more specifically, it is as easily grasped as it can be that these 
anapodeiktoi are formally valid, and so there is nothing whose validity is more easily grasped 
that can be applied to them. Compare  
 
(H) the [simple] indemonstrables are those [syllogisms] for which it is immediately 
clear (autothen saphes) that they conclude, that is that in them the conclusion follows 
from (suneisagetai) the premisses.
22
 (SE M 8.228) 
 
This suggests that the Stoics also had cases of valid arguments that are in need of 
demonstration and, that is, for which there is something that is more easily grasped than them 
that is used in their demonstration. Consider the following two passages that report Stoic 
theory. (They are extensions of (A) and (B)):
23
 
 
(B+) For they say [the anapodeiktoi] are the arguments which are not in need of 
demonstration (apodeixeōs) for the establishment of their own conclusiveness but are 
                                                          
21
 The identification within syllogistic of indemonstrability and lack of need for demonstration is not 
unique to the Stoics. In the commentary to his translation of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, Barnes 
identifies Aristotelian uses of anapodeiktos in which ‘being indemonstrable’ and ‘not being in need of 
demonstration’ appear to be used interchangeably (Barnes 1994, 95). 
22
 ὧν ἁπλοῖ μέν εἰσιν οἱ αὐτόθεν σαφὲς ἔχοντες τὸ ὅτι συνάγουσιν, τουτέστι τὸ ὅτι συνεισάγεται 
αὐτῶν τοῖς λήμμασιν ἡ ἐπιφορά. (SE M 8.228) 
23
 The expression ‘they say’ marks (B+) out as reliable, despite the fact that it is part of a Sceptic 
refutation of Stoic doctrine. This is common in Sextus. I assume that Sextus is here drawing on the 
same – intermediate – source on which he draws at SE M 8.223, as is frequently the case in the two 
works. 
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demonstrative (apodeiktikous) of the fact that the other syllogisms, too, conclude.
24
 
(SE PH 2.156)   
 
(A+) And there are some [arguments] that are indemonstrable(s) (anapodeiktoi) since 
they do not need a demonstration (apodeixeōs), a different number according to 
different [Stoics], five according to Chrysippus.
25
 Through these every argument is 
composed (pleketai).
26
 (DL 7.79)   
 
Both texts use the noun apodeixis saying that the anapodeiktoi do not need an apodeixis, and 
both relate the anapodeiktoi to other valid arguments or syllogisms. (This further confirms 
that for the Stoics the phrase ‘needs no apodeixis’ is not intended as a definition of 
anapodeiktos. It is in the context of comparison with other syllogisms that it becomes the 
crucial characteristic of the anapodeiktoi: ‘since’ in A+, ‘but’ in B+.) (B+) spells out this 
relation. The indemonstrables are ‘demonstrative of the fact that the other syllogisms, too, 
conclude’. Indirectly, then, by using again the definition of apodeixis in (D), here we obtain 
information about something that Stoic analysis does: it makes things, more precisely the 
validity of non-indemonstrable syllogisms, easier to grasp.  
 
We know that the relation between the indemonstrables and the other syllogisms is that the 
latter can be reduced by analysis via one or more of the Stoic themata, or some other Stoic 
inference rule, into the former (DL 7.78, Bobzien 1999, 2019). So this relation too can be 
expressed in epistemic terms. We can assume (we do not know) that a demonstration 
(apodeixis) of a syllogism S would involve an analysis that reduces or analyses S by way of 
one or more themata into one or more syllogisms that are more obviously conclusive than S 
itself. For a syllogism not to be in need of a demonstration is thus a complex property that 
combines epistemic and logical elements. First, it is its validity that is evident or as easy to 
                                                          
24
  οὗτοι γάρ εἰσιν οὕς φασιν ἀποδείξεως μὲν μὴ δεῖσθαι πρὸς τὴν ἑαυτῶν σύστασιν, ἀποδεικτικοὺς δὲ 
ὑπάρχειν τοῦ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους συνάγειν λόγους. (SE PH 2.156)   
25
 It would be useful to know more about this alleged disagreement about the number of (kinds of) 
indemonstrables and what criteria were used to justify the different Stoic choices. However there is no 
surviving evidence. From later ancient logic texts we may conjecture that later Stoics may have added 
multi-conjunct or multi-disjunct syllogisms, or simply counted Chrysippus’ multi-disjunct fifth 
syllogism as a sixth syllogism, or possibly added the later so-called wholly hypothetical syllogisms. 
But all this is uncertain. (No text suggests that the second indemonstrables were ditched, see below.) 
26
 εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἀναπόδεικτοί τινες, τῷ μὴ χρῄζειν ἀποδείξεως, ἄλλοι μὲν παρ᾿ ἄλλοις, παρὰ δὲ τῷ 
Χρυσίππῳ πέντε, δι᾿ ὧν πᾶς λόγος πλέκεται. (DL 7.79)   
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grasp as can be. This implies second, that even if it could be analysed by use of any 
thema(ta), the validity of the resulting syllogism would be no more easily graspable than the 
original syllogism itself.  
 
Apodeixis and analysis. En passant, this provides insight in the difficult issue how the Stoics 
thought about the meta-logical elements of logical analysis. Remember that demonstrations 
are arguments. Thus the demonstration of an argument A is itself done in the form of an 
argument, call it a meta-argument. It appears that such a meta-argument would have A 
occurring in its conclusion, with validity or syllogismhood predicated of it; that it would have 
occurring in one premise a thema application; and in one or more separate premises an 
argument each. And the arguments (and presumably the thema) in the premises would have 
to be more easily grasped than A. Ideally, such meta-arguments should be indemonstrables, 
too. Not only are all our examples of Stoic demonstrations indemonstrables (e.g. (F) above); 
more importantly, this would also avoid a hierarchy of meta-arguments (see below).  
 
Here is an example which uses the first thema and analyses a two-premise syllogism A into 
another two-premise syllogism. Take as the syllogism whose syllogismhood is to be 
demonstrated, the following argument: ‘it is day; but not: it is light; so not: if it is day, it is 
light’. Call it syllogism A.  Note that syllogism A is not a Stoic indemonstrable. Call the 
syllogism ‘if it is day, it is light; but: it is day; so it is light’ syllogism B. Note that syllogism 
B is a first indemonstrable. Recall that the Stoic first thema is 
 
(I) When from two <propositions> a third is deduced, then from either of them 
together with the/a contradictory of the conclusion the/a contradictory of the other is 
deduced.
27
 (Apul. Int.209.12-16) 
 
The meta-argument then is 
 
                                                          
27
 … appellaturque a Stoicis prima constitutio vel primum expositu. quod sic definiunt: Si ex duobus 
tertium quid colligitur, alterum eorum cum contrario illationis colligit contrarium reliquo 
(Apul.Int.209.11-14). Apuleius’ choice of ‘expositu’ (‘bare’, ‘exposed’) as one possible translation of 
‘thema’ indicates that the themata were considered as evident. 
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Premise 1 If ‘if it is day, it is light; but: it is day; so it is light’ is a syllogism, then ‘it is 
day; but not: it is light; so not: if it is day, it is light’ is a syllogism.  
Premise 2 But ‘if it is day, it is light; but: it is day; so it is light’ is a syllogism.  
Conclusion Hence ‘it is day; but not: it is light; so not: if it is day, it is light’ is a 
syllogism.  
 
Premise 1 is an application of the first thema to syllogism A. Premise 2 is the antecedent of 
Premise 1. The conclusion is the consequent of Premise 1. It states the syllogismhood of 
syllogism A, i.e. of the argument whose validity is to be demonstrated. Thus the meta-
argument is a demonstration of syllogism A that includes an application of the first thema in 
its first premise. By way of this demonstration, syllogism A has been made more easily 
graspable, since it has been reduced by a more easily graspable thing (the meta-argument) to 
a more easily graspable thing. First, the demonstration or meta-argument is itself a first 
indemonstrable, and as such cannot be made more easily graspable. (Of course my 
articulation may be lousy: the representation of the argument might be improved on and the 
meta-argument made more easily graspable in that way.) Second, syllogism B, to which it has 
been reduced, is also a first indemonstrable, and as such cannot be made more easily 
graspable. Third, the first thema is also evident (cf. fn.27) and cannot be made more easily 
graspable (with the possibility of improved formulation again discounted). These 
demonstrations would be a species or subclass of the demonstrations covered by the Stoic 
definitions of demonstration (above texts (D) and (E).)  
 
How do such demonstrations avoid a hierarchy of meta-arguments? If the meta-argument 
had, say, the form the non-indemonstrable syllogism A has, one could require that it be made 
more easily graspable by a (meta-)analysis. If this (meta-)analysis also had the form of a non-
indemonstrable syllogism, one could require that it be made more easily graspable by a 
(meta-meta-)analysis, and so on. 
 
By removing the epistemic requirement that the arguments or arguments in the premises are 
to be more easily graspable than the argument in the conclusion, we can construct examples 
of Stoic meta-logical formulations of a step in an analysis in general. Still, while a 
demonstration (apodeixis) is an argument, analysis is a method of deduction or an instance of 
the application of that method. At most, one-step instances of that method would be 
15 
 
arguments. However, our examples of analysis (SE M 8.230-38) do not suggest that a one-
step analysis needs to have the form of an argument.  
 
Apodeixis and the role of the indemonstrables. If all this is correct, we can also answer a 
question about the Stoic indemonstrables that has puzzled some logicians and historians of 
logic.
28
 The Stoic first thema (above text (I)) seems to allow as a special case of application 
the analysis of a second indemonstrable into a first, and of a first indemonstrable into a 
second. Thus from the point of view of modern axiomatic systems, with the indemonstrables 
(or alternatively indemonstrable schemata) as axioms and themata as deduction rules, either 
the first or the second indemonstrables (or their indemonstrable schemata) are redundant. 
Now, it is not unheard of that logicians have proposed systems with redundant axioms.
29
 
However, this is usually either an oversight that is adjusted at some later point, or there are 
some other reasons (e.g. retaining cut elimination) that make a redundant axiom useful or 
required. Neither case appears to capture what we know about Stoic syllogistic. We can 
assume that the Stoics were aware of the mutual reducibility of a first and a corresponding 
second indemonstrable, since this involves one of the two most basic applications of the first 
thema. So far no logical property has been identified that would require both first and second 
indemonstrables as axioms. However, as was already hinted by Michael Frede, it is plausible 
that with regard to the immediate evidence of their conclusiveness, the Stoics considered the 
two kinds of indemonstrables as on a par (Frede 1974, 131). Reducing a case of modus 
tollens to a case of modus ponens does not make the first clearer, since it is already 
immediately and evidently clear that it is valid. The Stoic criterion for the choice of their 
kinds of indemonstrables (or indemonstrable schemata) is then not motivated by minimizing 
their number qua number of axioms, or preserving a logical (as opposed to epistemic) 
property. Rather, it is motivated by retaining those kinds that cannot be made clearer to us 
with the help of analysis by logical inference rules such as the themata. Thus, demonstrability 
rather than axiomhood would be the criterion for the Stoic choice of basic syllogisms. If so, it 
                                                          
28
 See e.g. Ierodiakonou, 2006, 1.1 ; Bobzien 2019, p.244 fn.21. Mueller, 1979, p.205 and Hitchcock 
2006, p.227 mention that a second indemonstrable is derivable from a first (but not the other way 
about). Mueller does not consider the question why the anapodeiktoi are anapodeiktoi. 
29
 E.g. Axiom PM.4 in Principia Mathematica, shown to be redundant by Paul Bernay in 1926; 
Bernays, Paul, 1926, “Axiomatische Untersuchungen des Aussagen-Kalküls der Principia 
Mathematica”, Mathematische Zeitschrift, 25: 305–320. doi:10.1007/BF01283841; Łukasiewicz 
showed that the axiom systems of the calculus of propositions proposed by Frege, Russell, and Hilbert 
each contained a different redundant axiom, e.g. Axiom P1 (p➝p) in Hilbert’s propositional calculus; 
some schemata in Gentzen’s systems LK and LJ are redundant, cf. Gentzen 1934, 193.   
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is not strictly correct when Frede (1974, 128) and Łukasiewicz (1935, 117) assert that the 
indemonstrables were called indemonstrables because their role is that of axioms. The fact 
that the rejection of the Two-senses Assumption allows us to make sense of the redundancy 
of one of the five kinds of Stoic indemonstrables should speak in favour of this rejection. Of 
course the Stoics, like Medieval and contemporary logicians, may have allowed for redundant 
axioms for ease of application. Even in this case, the ease gained by having both the first and 
second indemonstrables is not great. More significantly, even in this case it would be hard to 
find a reason for the choice of those two other than their immediate evidence. 
 
Apodeixis and deduction. It is a common, if incorrect, assumption that the demonstrations 
which the alpha privative in an-apodeiktos counters are Stoic deductions. Scholars generally 
assume that the apodeixis that corresponds to the anapodeiktoi is Stoic deduction and that the 
claim that the anapodeiktoi need no apodeixis is another way of saying that they need no 
analysis. For example, this assumption is made by Mates 1961, 63, Mueller 1978, 11 and 
Frede 1974, 132, and appears to be presupposed in Barnes’ and Hitchcock’s reasoning. It is 
also commonly invoked or presupposed in the argument that anapodeiktos should be 
translated as unproved or undemonstrated rather than unprovable or indemonstrable: for 
example that it is false that anapodeiktoi cannot be analysed, since matching first and second 
anapodeiktoi appear to be mutually analysable. There is however (i) no evidence for the 
assumption that apodeixis in texts (A+), (B+), (C), and in Stoic logic generally, means 
something like deduction or analysis. No reliable Stoic source uses apodeixis or its cognates 
to refer to or describe a Stoic analysis or its result. Instead, Stoic terms commonly used are 
logos, analusis, analuein, sullogismos, sunagōgē, sunagein, perainein, kata synagōgēn, etc. 
(Passages (B+), (H) and (I) are examples.) In particular, no definition of apodeixis in this 
sense is ever supplied. By analysing a non-indemonstrable one does not per se make it more 
easily graspable. One just applies some logical apparatus.
30
 There is also (ii) no need for the 
                                                          
30
  It has been suggested that strictly speaking in Stoic sequent logic, the anapodeiktoi are not 
analysable either. Bobzien argues that Stoic analysis is such that once an axiom has been reached no 
further rule can be applied (Bobzien 1996, 2019). Matching first and second indemonstrables are then 
not analysable into each other. Barnes, too, seems to think this (2007, 371, ‘[t]he five Chrysippean 
unproveds are the five syllogistic forms which the Chrysippean system does not prove.’) though he 
does not say why. If this is correct, then for every non-indemonstrable syllogism (or formally valid 
argument) there would exist a demonstration (apodeixis) or a concatenation of demonstrations that 
corresponds to some analysis of it. The demonstrations would be meta-arguments of the type given 
above. Still, the analysis of an argument would not be its demonstration, as the examples of analysis 
in Sextus (SE M 8.235-7) illustrate. Also, the redundancy of the first and second indemonstrables is 
retained even if indemonstrables, once reached, cannot be analysed further. The difference between 
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assumption, since as we have seen there is a historically documented alternative notion of 
apodeixis that provides an explanation of the occurrence in Stoic logic of apodeixis and 
anapodeiktos that explains the epistemic language in those passages, makes do with one – 
documented – Stoic notion of apodeixis and removes the apparent incongruence in the 
explication ‘no need for apodeixis’ in (A+), (B+), (C).  
 
So, since there is an alternative, epistemic, notion for which the expression apodeixis is used, 
and (A+), (B+), (C) invoke epistemic elements, the identification in Stoic syllogistic of 
apodeixis with deduction is unsubstantiated and unnecessary.
31
 Historically, we can see how 
such an identification arose possibly already in late antiquity. Peripatetics like Alexander use 
apodeixis and apodeiknunai (‘to demonstrate’) in order to express the proof of the validity of 
an Aristotelian syllogism (cf. Barnes et al 1991, 20-21). Such a proof would be the Peripatetic 
analogue to a Stoic analysis. This use of apodeixis and cognate terms is likely to have 
eclipsed the Stoic distinction between the analysis of an argument and what would be its 
apodeixis. This historical development does of course have no impact on the fact that, for the 
reasons just given, any argument against the translation of ‘indemonstrable’ based on the 
assumed identification in Stoic logic of apodeixis and deduction or analysis fails. 
 
There is thus a web of reasons why the standard translation ‘indemonstrable’ can be retained 
and why the translations ‘indemonstrable’ or ‘unprovable’ are preferable to ‘undemonstrated’ 
and ‘unproved’.  Historically, ‘indemonstrable’ may be preferable. Either way, it seems not 
advisable to mingle Stoic epistemic and Stoic logical terminology in translations (as we find 
it e.g. in Mueller 1978, Hitchcock 2006). Whichever modern-language word family one uses 
for apodeixis, apodeiknumi, apodeiktikos, anapodeiktos is best reserved for those epistemic 
terms and avoided for translations of the aforementioned logical terms. Failure to do so just 
adds to the muddle.  
 
Apodeixis and dialectic. There are three mentions that relate demonstration with Stoic 
dialectic in Diogenes Laertius. One is the anecdote that Chrysippus told Cleanthes that all he 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
demonstrability and analysability is thus retained in the choice of indemonstrables. If it was just 
analysability, we would expect the first or the second indemonstrables to be eliminated. 
31
 So, even though it may be correct that indemonstrables need no analysis in Stoic sequent logic, this 
is not what texts (A), (B), (C) were intended to express where they say that Stoic indemonstrables 
need no demonstration. At the very most, analysis would be a species of apodeixis, but even for this 
there is no indication in our sources, and it does not sit well with our texts. 
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needed were the views (dogmata) of Stoic philosophy, he would find the proofs or 
demonstrations (apodeixeis) for them himself (DL 7.179). Here a demonstration is clearly an 
argument in support of a philosophical statement, not an argument about the validity of a 
complex syllogism. The other two are in my view related to the same topic. A Chrysippean 
book title ‘On the fact that the ancients admit dialectic along with demonstrations’ (DL 
7.201) and a summary statement that the Stoics say ‘that the consideration (or theory) of 
syllogisms is most useful; for it makes manifest that which can be demonstrated (to 
apodeiktikon)’ (DL 7.45). Both sentences are found in an epistemological context. The 
second is followed by definitions of argument, syllogism and then of demonstration (above 
(D)). In both cases the point appears to be that dialectic, and in particular syllogistic, is at the 
service of demonstrating philosophical tenets.
32
 The epistemological context in both cases 
would seem to rule it out that that which is or can be demonstrated by demonstrations is the 
validity of non-indemonstrable syllogisms.  
 
Refutation of Mates’ argument against a single Stoic notion of apodeixis. My main 
contention has been that the notion of demonstration that gives rise to the Stoic term 
‘indemonstrable’ is the Stoic epistemic notion of demonstration for which we have extant 
definitions. Why, one may ask, is this assumption virtually absent in the literature on 
Stoicism, particularly, since there is no evidence of any other Stoic notion of demonstration, 
let alone another definition? Perhaps in contemporary scholarship this absence has gained 
support via Benson Mates’ highly influential monograph Stoic Logic (Mates 1961), which I 
mentioned at the outset of this paper.  
 
Mates writes that in the classification of fundamental valid arguments (1) ‘the term 
“demonstrated” (apodeiktikos) has a far different meaning from that which it has in the 
contexts of’ Sextus’ report of the Stoic demonstrative arguments and definition of 
demonstration; and that hence (2) ‘it is clear that’ ‘the sense of “demonstrate” ...  involved in 
the Stoic term “undemonstrated” as applied to the basic arguments’ ‘is not the same sense 
involved in the word “demonstrative” [i.e. apodeiktikos]’ (Mates 1961, 63).  
 
                                                          
32
 The book title at DL 7.201 has been given a more complex interpretation by Brunschwig 1995, 
picked up in Bronowski 2019, 26-7.This seems to me to be too speculative, although it is consistent 
with what I suggest. 
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Mates offers the following two points in support for his claim. (a) ‘an invalid argument would 
be non-demonstrative [i.e. ouk apodeiktikos], but it would not be undemonstrated [i.e. 
anapodeiktos].’ (ibid.) and (b) ‘[c]onversely, the “milk” and “pores” arguments, which were 
examples of demonstrative arguments, are also examples of the type I undemonstrated 
argument’ [i.e. examples of first indemonstrables] (ibid. fn.27; for the “pores” argument see 
text (F) above). However, Mates makes a number of questionable assumptions, and once 
these have been sorted, his argument crumbles.  
 
First, he assumes without comment that the correct translation of anapodeiktos is 
‘undemonstrated’. We have seen that this assumption is not warranted.  
 
Second, Mates’ claim (1) has a false presupposition, namely that a synonym of the Stoic term 
anapodeiktos occurs in the context of Sextus’ reports of Stoic demonstrative arguments (i.e. 
SE PH 2.135-143, M 8.299-314). It does not occur in that context. What occurs in that 
context is the expression ‘not demonstrative’ (ouk apodeiktikos). Mates wrongly assumes that 
the Stoic terms ‘not demonstrative’ and ‘indemonstrable’ (anapodeiktos) are synonymous, or 
at least that the first entails the second. This is however not so. In Stoic logic only the use of 
‘not’ (ouk / ou / ouch / ouchi) in front of an expression provides contradictory opposites. The 
alpha privative, though a kind of negation, does not guarantee contradictoriness (DL 7.70 
with Apul. Int.191.6-11, SE M 8.103). There is then nothing problematic in there being things 
that are both not demonstrative (ouk apodeiktikos) and not an indemonstrable (anapodeiktos). 
Mates’ justification (a) of his claim (1) hence also loses its force.33  
 
Third and related, Mates’ claim (1) appears to wrongly presuppose that the Stoic expressions 
‘anapodeiktos’ and ‘ouk apodeiktikos’ are used as part of a discussion of the same distinction, 
namely a distinction of arguments (logoi). Mates disregards (although he mentions it earlier 
in the same chapter) that the Stoic distinction between apodeiktikoi and ouk apodeiktikoi is a 
distinction of arguments (logoi). The Stoic expressions are short for ‘apodeiktikoi logoi’ and 
‘ouk apodeiktikoi logoi’ respectively. By contrast, ‘anapodeiktoi’ is short for ‘anapodeiktoi 
sullogismoi’, and the anapodeiktoi are part of a two-fold distinction of syllogisms or formally 
                                                          
33
 The expression anapodeiktos appears to have been used as opposite both to apodeiktikos (active 
form) and to apodeiktos (passive form). There is no ancient Greek word anapodeiktikos. The Stoic use 
the active form, so the question whether in their view something could have been both apodeiktos and 
anapodeiktos does not occur. 
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valid arguments. In this respect, too, there is nothing problematic to find one expression that 
negates an aspect of demonstration in the definition by division of one kind of objects and 
another expression that negates a different aspect of demonstration in the context of a 
different kind of objects.   
 
Fourth and related, Mates’ claim (1) appears to wrongly presuppose that the negating element 
in the Stoic expressions anapodeiktos and ouk apodeiktikos have the same function. They do 
not have the same function. Invalid arguments are not demonstrative (ouk apodeiktikos), 
since they are not demonstrations. A demonstration is the same as a demonstrative argument, 
and it presupposes validity (SE PH 2.135-143, SE M 8.301-314, Mates 1961, 60-3, Barnes 
1980, Allen 2008, Study III.5). By contrast, indemonstrable syllogisms (anapodeiktoi) are 
indemonstrable, since no demonstration can be given of their validity or syllogismhood, 
because their syllogismhood is already fully evident and hence maximally graspable. This 
difference does not impact the fact that in both cases the very same notion of demonstration 
(apodeixis) is at issue. The dissimilarity that the demonstrandum in one case is a simple 
conclusion (e.g. ‘there exist imperceptible pores’, above (F)), in the other a sentence that 
contains reference to an entire argument, presumably in the subject expression, and its formal 
validity or syllogismhood, presumably in the predicate expression, does not affect the truths 
that the underlying notion of demonstration is the same and that it is the Stoic epistemic one 
for which we have definitions. Hence, Mates inference (2) is faulty, since it does not follow 
that if the two expressions ‘not demonstrative’ and ‘indemonstrable’ have different meanings, 
so do the corresponding positive expressions (apodeixis and apodeiktikos).  
 
Likewise, fifth, there is no problem with Mates’ second allegedly problematic case (b). A 
demonstration like (F) reveals its conclusion and makes it more easily graspable than its 
premises are. At the same time, syllogisms like (F) are indemonstrables, since the fact that 
they are formally valid or a syllogism is fully evident and as such does not permit a 
demonstration, because the function of a demonstration is to reveal something that is not 
evident or at least to make it more graspable. Moreover, the word apodeiktikos, which Mates 
assumes to be related solely to the passages that explain the definition of apodeixis and its 
synonym apodeiktikos logos (implied, SE M 8.311, 314, SE PH 2.140, 143), actually occurs 
also in the context of the indemonstrables (SE PH 2.156, quoted above as text (B+)).  
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So, pace Mates (Mates 1961, 63), we have every reason to assume that ‘the sense of 
“demonstrate” ...  involved in the Stoic term “undemonstrated” [i.e. anapodeiktos] as applied 
to the basic arguments’ is ‘the same sense involved in the word “demonstrative” [i.e. 
apodeiktikos]’.34 
 
Results. It is the principal point of this paper that in their syllogistic (sequent logic, theory of 
deduction ...), where the Stoics use the word apodeixis and its cognates they use their 
epistemic notion of apodeixis of which definitions and explications have survived. On this 
basis, we can conclude that there is an array of jointly compelling reasons for assuming that 
the translation ‘indemonstrable’, understood as meaning ‘cannot be demonstrated’ is 
accurate: It makes sense of the Stoic explication ‘no need of demonstration’. It avoids the 
difficulties with passage (C) which translations like ‘unproved’ introduce. It makes do with 
just one Stoic notion of demonstration, the one of which we have two Stoic definitions. It can 
explain the relation between Stoic analysis and Stoic demonstration. It can explain why one 
Stoic kind of indemonstrables, although it appears redundant, is retained by the Stoics. It can 
make sense of the – apparent – difficulties on the basis of which Mates infers that the 
indemonstrables have nothing to do with Stoic demonstration.   
 
                                                          
34
 A passage in Sextus suggests that some Stoics called all their syllogisms indemonstrables, both 
simple and non-simple ones, where non-simple ones are those analysable into simple ones. This has 
generated much discussion, but no convincing solution. Frede 1974, 130, compellingly shows that the 
first meaning of anapodeiktos in (C) cannot refer to all Stoic syllogisms, simple and non-simple, and 
also refutes Mates’ self-declared ‘entirely conjectural’ suggestion regarding the meaning of 
“undemonstrated” as applied by the Stoics to the five types of basic arguments (Mates 1961, 64 with 
fn.30). Frede’s own suggestion is however similarly forced. I offer two alternative explanations. 
Sextus is generally a most reliable source for Stoic logic where he reports Stoic theory. However, in 
this case I believe that it is plausible that the occurrence of anapodeiktoi is an – inadvertent – error, 
whether introduced by Sextus or his non-Stoic source. The distinction of these two types of Stoic 
indemonstrables occurs nowhere else. It is not picked up by Sextus later in the text. There is not even 
a hint in the following long report of Stoic analysis that would explain why the non-simple syllogisms 
are indemonstrables. Usually at the end of a sceptical argument Sextus repeats his initial thesis. In this 
case, the sceptical argument is in SE M 8.239-243, where no mention of non-simple indemonstrables 
is found. If on the other hand the text must be left as it is, here is my best offer. The Stoics often use 
the same philosophical expression in a wider and in a narrower sense.  Assuming a wider sense for all 
syllogisms, non-simple syllogisms are then indemonstrable in this wider derivative sense. An analysis 
uses indemonstrables and themata, and we can assume that the themata were considered evident. 
(Apuleius offers expositum, English ‘bare’ or ‘exposed’, as one of two translation of the Stoic term 
thema, Apul.Int.209.10-12.) So derivatively, as the result of the use of evident rules to reduce in 
evident steps the non-simple syllogisms to evident syllogisms, the non-simple syllogisms inherit the 
evidence of this procedure. This is of course entirely conjectural.  
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Coda. Let me end with a historical note. In Latin texts from antiquity the only occurrences of 
indemonstrabilis are thirteen in Apuleius’ De Interpretatione (listed in Belli 2014, 76) and 
sixteen in Boethius’ logical writings (Belli 2014, 53), including two used of Peripatetic 
syllogistic modes (Boeth.Syll.Cat.823A = 75.14-15 Thomsen Th rnqvist) and importantly 
one of the Stoic indemonstrables (Boeth.Com.Arist.Int.II 351.8 Meiser
35
). We can assume 
that both authors translate from a Greek source the expression anapodeiktos (cf.  Kneale & 
Kneale 1962, 164 fn.3, Barnes 2007, 372; Belli 2014, 65 and assumed passim; Ramsey 2017, 
235) and it is likely that they arrived at this translation independently of each other (Belli 
2014, 59-60). The term then makes its way into medieval philosophical and theological texts 
(Belli 2014, 68-74) and into the earliest Latin translations of Sextus and early translations of 
Diogenes Laertius,
36
 and from there into English and other modern languages, languages in 
which the ambiguity is no longer present, and nolens volens a choice is made.
37
 So, this 
development provides a historical explanation of the predominance of the translation of 
anapodeiktos as ‘indemonstrable’. It comes to us via an Anglicisation (etc.) of the Latin 
indemonstrabilis, with presumably unnoticed disambiguation. So, not only is 
‘indemonstrables’ a philosophically correct rendering of the Stoic anapodeiktoi, it is also the 
historically grown translation.  
 
 
                                                          
35
 ‘And he makes this syllogism in the second hypothetical mode, which he calls indemonstrable, in 
this way: if the first is, the second is; but the second is not, hence the first is not.’ (Fecit autem hunc 
syllogismum in secondo modo hypothetico quem indemonstrabilem vocat hoc modo: si primum est, 
secundum est; sed secundum non est, primum igitur non est. Boeth.Com.Arist.Int.II 351.7-10, Meiser.)  
36
 Sextus, first Latin  translation of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Henricus Stephanus (1562), p.93, 
indemonstrabiles; Sextus, first Latin translation of Adversos Mathematicos, Hervet (1569), p.425, SE 
M 8.223: ‘indemonstrabilis’, ‘indemonstrabiles’, ‘quae non opus habent demonstratione’. Diogenes 
Laertius: The first translation of Diogenes into Latin, by Henricus Aristippus, is lost. The 2
nd
 Latin 
translation, Traversari (1455, MS), was originally completed between 1427 and 1433. Traversari 
obviously had difficulties rendering anapodeiktos. On the relevant page (carta 102 verso, which 
includes DL 7.79-81) he leaves a gap for the translation of anapodeiktoi before dicuntur, as if to fill in 
later perhaps after some research on the Greek term. He avoids the Latin noun for anapodeiktos in the 
accounts for the first, second, fourth and fifth indemonstrables; for the third he decides on tertia 
demostrativa.  
37
 Sextus, first English translation of the Outlines of Pyrrhonism, Thomas Stanley (1655-60), part XII, 
p.502, ‘Indemonstrable’; Diogenes Laertius, first English translation (Fetherstone et al 1696), 
‘Anopodeicti’; Diogenes Laertius, second English translation, Yonge (1853), ‘demonstration’, 
indemonstrable’ (DL 7.78), ‘demonstration’, ‘not demonstrated’ (DL 7.79). Sextus, French tr., Huart 
(1725), indémonstrables’, Sextus, German tr., Buhle (1801), ‘indemonstrabeln’.  
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